Closing the Custody Floodgate: Florida Adopts the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act by Kutun, Barry & Fox, Roberta
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 4
Spring 1978
Closing the Custody Floodgate: Florida Adopts the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Barry Kutun
Roberta Fox
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barry Kutun & Roberta Fox, Closing the Custody Floodgate: Florida Adopts the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 6 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 409 (2014) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol6/iss2/4
CLOSING THE CUSTODY FLOODGATE: FLORIDA ADOPTS
THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
BARRY KUTUN* AND ROBERTA Fox**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a sober commentary on child custody litigation that the most
salient feature of this area of family law is the degree of indignation
it inspires in the typically understated pages of legal journals. Criti-
cism has ranged from the succinct characterization of custody litiga-
tion techniques as "barbaric"' to the florid description of custody
litigation as "a hideous, cancerous chancre on the body of American
jurisprudence."'2 Of one fact there can be little doubt: the present
status of child custody litigation, for whatever reasons, is an embar-
rassment and a blight on the whole area of family law.
Legal kidnapping is just one of the more effective means em-
ployed to take advantage of the jurisdictional loopholes in child
custody laws. The most publicized case of legal kidnapping involved
the wealthy Mellon family. Seward Grosser Mellon and Karen Boyd
Mellon were divorced in 1974. A Pennsylvania court awarded cus-
tody of their two children, Constance Elizabeth, 5, and Catherine
Leigh, 7, to their father. In fall, 1975, the children visited their
mother in North Carolina. Mrs. Mellon, by her own account, slipped
the children away from their governess and onto a chartered plane
to New York. In just a few short months the children had used nine
names and had stayed in 14 hotels and finally in a middle class
home in Brooklyn. Meanwhile, a New York court granted custody
to Mrs. Mellon. Subsequently, in March, 1976, as the children were
being escorted to school by an armed guard, they were snatched
by three men posing as F.B.I. agents. The three men disarmed the
guard, put the children into a car, and delivered them to Mr. Mellon
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in Pittsburgh. Mr. Mellon promptly called the New York police and
the F.B.I. and informed the authorities that the children had ar-
rived safely.3 Other incidents have occurred in which the results
were more shocking:
In a recent Oklahoma tragedy a four-year-old and his father died
in a wreck following a high speed auto chase after the father had
snatched the boy from the custody of his mother and tried to leave
the state. After the boy had been seized, the mother's brother had
given chase and forced the car off the road. In another incident in
Massachusetts, two brothers were violently snatched and removed
to their father's Alabama home. The boys had been playing when
two men chased them and knocked one from his bicycle to accom-
plish the abduction. Fortunately, the snatch went smoothly
enough that the men did not have to use the tear gas or the club
they were armed with. This operation was orchestrated by a person
who was recommended to the father by a veteran of over 400 child
snatchings1
Kidnapping is not the only problem. The following is a typical
scenario: State A awards custody of the child to mother Jane living
in state A. The child spends his summer with father Bob in state
B. Father Bob refuses to return the child on the ground that the
child's best interests will be furthered if the child remains in state
B. He seeks a court decree in state B granting him custody. The
court is faced with a dilemma:
If the court, in order to protect the best interests of the child,
reopens the custody question, it encourages parents to violate ex-
isting decrees in order to gain access to a more favorable forum; in
effect, the court rewards a form of child stealing. Yet if the court
refused to reopen the question, it risks rendering an order discon-
sonant with the [alleged] best interests of the child.'
Proposed solutions to this dilemma have varied. It has been sug-
gested that criminal penalties be imposed for removing a child from
a lawful custodian in violation of a custody decree, that Congress
amend the Judiciary Act so that full faith and credit must be given
to custody decrees,' that courts voluntarily refrain from modifying
3. St. Petersburg Times, March 26, 1976, § A, at 20, col. 1.
4. Noelker, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: The Difficulties It Presents for
Poor People, in CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw 222 (1977).
5. Ferreira v. Ferreira, 512 P.2d 304, 307 (Cal. 1973).
6. See id.; Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948); Currie, Full Faith and
Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 89.
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custody decrees rendered in another state,' or that states adopt the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The last sugges-
tion has recently emerged as the most popular of the four.' Profes-
sor Leona Mary Hudak, speaking in reference to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, viewed its passage as essential. "If the
Act's adoption is not simultaneous, unanimous, and reciprocal, the
presently rampant 'guerilla warfare' in child custody litigation will
merely perpetuate itself."9
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On May 2, 1975, House Bill 2013 (HB 2013), entitled "An Act
Relating to Child Custody; Creating the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act" was introduced by the House Committee on
Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and Representative
Barry Kutun.'0 The bill, which encompassed the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws," provided "a procedure for
determining jurisdiction in child custody cases between states."' 2
HB 2013 was read for the first time and placed on the House Calen-
dar on the day it was introduced; it was not referred to a commit-
tee.'
3
One week later, the Florida House of Representatives passed HB
2013 by a vote of 108 to 0.' On the same day, May 9, 1975, Senator
Jack Gordon introduced Senate Bill 1187 (SB1187), entitled "An
Act Relating to Child Custody; Creating the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act.' 1 5 On May 14, 1975, the Judiciary-Civil
Committee of the Florida Senate requested an extension of time
for consideration of SB 1187.'1 Having passed the house, HB 2013
was read in the senate for the first time on May 20, 1975, and re-
7. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 819, 825 (1944).
8. The states that have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act are Alaska,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 33 (Supp. 1978). Recently the Supreme Court of Washington urged that state's
legislature to adopt the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Dunkley v. Dunkley, 46
U.S.L.W. 1142 (Wash. Mar. 9, 1978).
9. Hudak, supra note 2, at 297.
10. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 394 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
11. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99 (1973).
12. FLA. H.R. JoUy. 394 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
13. Id. at 395.
14. Id. at 471.
15. FLA. S. JouR. 267 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
16. Id. at 304.
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ferred to the Judiciary-Civil Committee.'7 Neither bill received
further consideration during the 1975 legislative session.
During the 1976 session, the HRS Committee and Representative
Kutun again introduced HB 2013.'1 On April 16, 1976, HB 2013 was
amended, passed 110 to 0 and certified to the senate.19 The senate
received HB 2013 on April 23, 1976, and referred it to the Judiciary-
Civil Committee. 20 On May 11, 1976, the committee reported the
bill favorably with one amendment. HB 2013 was placed on the
Senate Calendar, but it failed to receive any further consideration.2'
Representative Kutun again introduced the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction bill (HB 650) for the 1977 legislative session. This
time the bill was co-sponsored by Representatives Roberta Fox and
George Hieber.2 2 The same day an identically titled bill, Senate Bill
410 (SB 410), was introduced in the senate by Senator Kenneth
Myers and referred to the Judiciary-Civil Committee. 3
On May 6, 1977, the House Judiciary Committee reported favora-
bly on HB 650 and referred it to the Committee on Appropriations. 2
On May 18, 1977, HB 650 was withdrawn from Appropriations and
placed on the House Calendar.2 5 Five days later, the Senate
Judiciary-Civil Committee reported Senator Myers' companion bill,
17. Id. at 339.
18. FLA. H.R. JouR. 106 (1976). The bill was introduced on April 6, 1976. Id. On April 9,
1976, a related bill, HB 3137, entitled "An Act Relating to Kidnapping and False Imprison-
ment," was introduced by Representative Thomas Lewis. HB 3137 prohibited persons
"without either a court order or the permission of any custodial parent residing in the state
from enticing or removing a child beyond the limits to the state." The bill was referred to
the Committee on Criminal Justice and was reported out of committee favorably with amend-
ments. FLA. H.R. Jout. 222, 663 (1976).
19. Id. at 302.
20. FLA. S. JoUR. 154 (1976).
21. Id. at 268. Nine days later HB 3137 was reported favorably with amendments by the
House Criminal Justice Committee. Though it was placed on the House Calendar, no further
action was taken on it. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 663 (1976).
22. FLA. H.R. JouR. 85 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
23. FLA. S. JOUR. 59, 169, 293, 396 (1977). Representative Lewis' bill, numbered HB 357
in 1977, was introduced on April 5, 1977, and was referred to the House Committees on
Criminal Justice and Appropriations. On April 20, 1977, HR 357 was reported favorably by
the House Committee on Criminal Justice and then referred to the Appropriations Commit-
tee. FLA. H.R. JouR. 328 (1977). Two days later it was withdrawn from Appropriations and
placed on the House Calendar. Id. at 330.
On May 3, 1977, another similar bill, SB 1289, entitled "An Act Relating to Dissolution of
Marriage," was introduced by Senator David McClain and was referred to the Judiciary-Civil
Committee. SB 1289 permitted "qualified staff of court to make investigations and social
studies in any action in which child custody is in issue ... " FLA. S. JOUR. 303 (1977). On
May 5, 1977, this bill was reported favorably by the Judiciary-Civil Committee and placed
on the calendar but was not considered. Id. at 337.
24. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 473 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
25. Id..at 607.
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SB 410, favorably and placed it on the Senate Calendar."6 On June
2, 1977, HB 650 was amended and passed 109 to 1; it was immedi-
ately certified to the Senate."
The Senate received HB 650 the next day and placed it on the
Special Order Calender.8 A parliamentary maneuver caused the bill
to be removed from the calendar and referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce. 9 However, in another maneuver on the same
day, HB 650 was withdrawn from the Commerce Committee, placed
back on the Special Order Calendar, and passed 27 to 8.30 The bill
was presented to the Governor on June 30, 1977, and signed into
law."'
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Florida adopted the language of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act without substantial change. 2 The legislature recognized
that the opportunities for cooperation and compliance between
states would be greatly enhanced if the uniform statutory language
were maintained nationwide. This recognition is consistent with the
''general purposes of the act," which are set forth as follows:
(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of
other states in matters of child custody which have in the past
resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful
effects on their well-being.
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end
that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child.
(3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of the child
takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where significant evidence
26. FLA. S. JOUR. 500 (1977).
27. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1145-46 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
28. FLA. S. JOUR. 76 (1977).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ch. 77-433, 1977 Fla. Laws 1756 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 61.1302-1348 (1977)).
32. There are only a few deviations from the exact terms of the Uniform Act in the Florida
version. In the section on purposes, subsection (b) of the Uniform Act has been omitted from
the Florida law. Compare FLA. STAT. § 61.1304 (1977) with § 1(b), 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 99,
104 (1973). That subsection states, "[this Act shall be construed to promote the general
purposes stated in this section." Id. Another change is the omission of the words "as a custody
decree rendered by a court of this state" in FLA. STAT. § 61.1332(1) (1977). Compare with §
15(a), 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 124 (1973). In addition section 25 of the Uniform
Act-severability-was omitted. Finally, Florida changed the term "divorce" to "dissolution
of marriage" wherever it appeared.
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concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have
closer connection with another state.
(4) Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child.
(5) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody awards.
(6) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this
state insofar as feasible.
(7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states.
(8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and other
forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and
those of other states concerned with the same child.
(9) [Make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act
among the states enacting it.]"
The expression of such detailed general purposes indicates the clear
intention that the specific provisions that follow be interpreted in
light of the clear legislative intent expressed in the Act.
The expansive reach of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, as reflected in its general purposes, indicates a legislative in-
tention to encourage and promote appropriate judicial intervention
in child custody matters. The Act:
requir[es] the addition of parties to a custody proceeding under
certain circumstances; provid[es] for the appearance of any party
as well as the child who is the subject of the custody proceeding
before the court under certain circumstances; provid[es] for the
binding force and res judicata effect of custody decrees;
provid[es] for the legal recognition of out-of-state custody decrees
and for the filing and enforcement of such decrees; provid[es] for
the modification of such decrees; requir[es] the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court to keep a registry of out-of-state custody decrees and
proceedings and authoriz[es] the clerk to provide certified copies
to certain courts and persons; provid[es] for the taking of testi-
mony in another state; provid[es] for hearings and studies in
another state as well as orders to appear .... 
By retaining most of the exact wording of the Uniform Act, the
Florida Legislature encouraged the application of existing case law
33. FLA. STAT. § 61.1304 (1977). Bracketed wording was substituted by the editors. See
note following FLA. STAT. § 61.1304 (1977).
34. Uniform Child Custody Jursdiction Act, ch. 77-433, 1977 Fla. Laws 1756 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (1977)).
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that has developed in those jurisdictions that have had time to
experience the problems that arise in interpreting and construing
statutory language. The precedential nature of identical and recip-
rocal statutes between states indicates the desire of those partici-
pating states to resolve perpetual constitutional conflicts with re-
spect to the individual sovereignty of states by establishing a uni-
form compact with consistently identical language.
IV. THE ISSUE OF INITIAL JURISDICTION
It has been noted that the child custody question can be separated
into three areas: (1) what state may initially determine custody; (2)
what state may later modify such an initial decree; and (3) the
extent to which such a determination is binding on other states. 5 A
variety of theories have been posed as answers to the questions
raised in these areas. The difficulties commonly encountered in
child custody litigation spring from the fact that, depending on the
state, any number of these theories can be used in a multitude of
situations. In the area of initial jurisdiction, the number of possible
theoretical approaches ranges from one 31 to four,37 although most
commentators agree on three which are the most commonly em-
ployed: domicile, actual presence, and jurisdiction over the par-
ents .3
A. Domicile
The traditional view is that proper jurisdiction to determine cus-
tody exists only in the state of the child's domicile simply because
the status of the child is affected in custody proceedings. 39 This is
the view adopted by the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 0
Domicile, however, is an abstract concept. A child's domiciliary
state is considered to be either the domiciliary state of the father"1
or, if the parents are separated, the domiciliary state of the parent
35. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964).
36. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 74, 109 (1934).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, Comment a (1971).
38. See Note, Child Custody Decrees-Interstate Recognition, 49 IOWA L. REv. 1178
(1964).
39. "Domicile" is defined as: "the relationship which the law creates between an individ-
ual and a particular locality or country. The place where a person has his true fixed perma-
nent home and principal establishment, and to which place he has, whenever he is absent,
the intention of returning and from which he has no present intention of moving."
BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (3d ed. 1969).
40. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); Note, Child Custody Decrees-Interstate
Recognition, 49 IOWA L. REv. 1178 (1964).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971).
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given custody or with whom the child is living.41 It is clear that
under the domicile theory a court assuming jurisdiction may do so
despite the fact that the child has never actually lived in the state.
This occurrence often forces a judge to determine what is in the
child's best interest even though the child and most of the compe-
tent evidence necessary to make such determination are located in
another state. 3
B. Actual Presence
Jurisdiction based on the actual presence of the child within the
state is founded on the parens patriae concept of a state's ability to
exercise its power for the benefit and welfare of its citizens." The
underlying assumption is that the state in which the child is located
has the greatest interest in attending to the child's welfare and
therefore is the most qualified state to render a custody determina-
tion. Unfortunately, the same basic flaw inherent in the domicile
theory-that of jurisdiction being assumed by a state in which the
child has never lived-is also present under this theory. A custody
decree rendered without adequate evidence by a court in a state
where the child is temporarily physically present may not actually
be in the best interest of the child.
C. Jurisdiction over the Parents
When a family quarrel results in a separation by mutual consent,
one spouse, along with the couple's children, often moves out of
state and, after a time, the other sues for divorce. The out-of-state
spouse makes no appearance at the hearing, and the other spouse
is awarded a divorce and custody of the children. In May v.
Anderson,45 the United States Supreme Court held that the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution and the
statutory provision passed pursuant to it 4" do not entitle an in per-
sonam judgment rendered without jurisdiction over one party to
receive full faith and credit. Implicit in this decision is the basic
foundation for the third theory of initial jurisdiction: if both parents
are present in state, jurisdiction may be properly assumed.
42. Id. § 32.
43. The "best interest" standard was recognized as early as 1881. Chapsky v. Wood, 26
Kan. 650 (1881). For an excellent analysis, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).
44. See Note, Child Custody Decrees-Interstate Recognition, 49 IowA L. REv. 1178, 1180
(1964).
45. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The May case is one of only four child custody cases heard by
the Supreme Court.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
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All three theories provide little deterrence to the rule of "seize and
run."47 Any theory of jurisdiction in which physical presence of the
child is a primary criterion encourages a parent to remove the child
to a state subscribing to such a position at the onset of custody
proceedings. When this happens, the other parent has no course of
action other than either to travel to the area to which the child has
been taken and institute or challenge legal proceedings or to at-
tempt to "recapture" the child. In the event that proceedings are
allowed in the new location, relevant evidence may be lacking or the
cost of bringing in witnesses may be prohibitive. Clearly, the "best
interests" of the child are sacrificed rather than furthered. The Uni-
form Act attempts to solve this problem.
V. INITIAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT
The UCCJA incorporates Professor Leonard Ratner's concept of
an "established home"" into a concept of the "home state" as a
basis for determining proper jurisdiction. Ratner's "established
home" idea involves a state in which a child has lived for sufficient
time to become "integrated into the community."49 Such integra-
tion "involves becoming familiar with the physical and cultural
environment, making close personal attachments, and adjusting to
an educational pattern. 50 This approach is modified in the UC CJA
to include "the state in which the child, immediately preceding the
time involved, lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting
as parent for at least 6 consecutive months [or], in the case of a
child less than 6 months old, the state in which the child lived from
birth with any of the persons mentioned."'" Mere physical presence
is ruled out as an exclusive basis for jurisdiction.2
Since physical presence is ruled out as the sole means of establish-
ing jurisdiction, states adopting the Act have attempted to insure
that a child will not be brought into the state against either his will
or the will of his custodian. To discourage removal from the state,
the UCCJA extends the "home state" concept to include a six-
month period preceding the initiation of a proceeding if "the child
47. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
48. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MIH. L. REv. 795, 815 (1964).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 815-16.
51. FLA. STAT. § 61.1306(5) (1977). The law as passed used the word "and." The editors
substituted the word "or" in the statute. See note following FLA. STAT. § 61.1306 (1977).
52. Id. § 61.1308(2) provides: "physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child
and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state
to make a child custody determination."
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is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a
person claiming his custody .... 5 3 This section applies not only in
instances of intentional removal but also in cases where the child
may be legitimately out of the state. For example, the child may be
attending school.
The Act provides a second basis for jurisdiction in the event there
is no "home state." A "strong contacts" rule allows jurisdiction if a
child and at least one contestant have a "significant connection
with the state" and there is available substantial evidence concern-
ing the child's "care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships. '54
These two alternative bases for jurisdiction do not preclude the
state from assuming jurisdiction in order to protect the child in an
emergency. Despite the absence of either "strong contacts" or
"home state" affiliations, jurisdiction may be assumed in cases
where the child has been abandoned or subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment, abuse, or neglect.5 Finally, if no other court can
assume or has assumed jurisdiction under any of the specified rules,
and it is in the best interest of the child, a court which is petitioned
may do so.56
VI. THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION
JURISDICTION
The question of whether a state may modify a custody decree of
another state is tied to the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution.57 Despite the fact that the full faith and credit
clause provides for recognition of the decrees of sister states, it is
generally considered inapplicable to custody decrees.5" The result
has been the furtherance of the "seize and run rule"-removal of the
child to another state by the non-custodial parent in order to reopen
custody litigation in an effort to have the original decree set aside.
Although four child custody cases have reached the United States
Supreme Court, the Court has cautiously avoided deciding the ques-
tion of whether the full faith and credit clause does, in fact, apply
53. Id. § 61.1308(1)(a)(2).
54. Id. § 61.1308(1)(b).
55. Id. § 61.1308(1)(c).
56. Id. § 61.1308(1)(d).
57. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
58. See Note, Child Custody Decrees-Interstate Recognition, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1178, 1185
(1964).
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to custody decrees.
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,51 the Court held that the
full faith and credit clause would not require a state to honor a
custody decree of another state if the state with initial jurisdiction
could have reconsidered the original decree when presented with
evidence not presented at the earlier hearing. 0 Halvey did not de-
cide the question of whether a custody decree may be modified by
a second state based not on "new evidence" alone. Rather, the opin-
ion recognized that the primary court had jurisdiction to modify its
decree; hence the secondary court could do the same.6' It is generally
assumed that Halvey requires that a custody decree of one state be
given only that degree of credit which it would be given in a subse-
quent proceeding in the same state.
Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion, exhibited remarkable
foresight in noting that "[t]he result seems unfortunate in that,
apparently, it may make possible a continuing round of litigation
over custody, perhaps also of abduction, between alienated par-
ents." 2 The passage of time has changed Justice Rutledge's predic-
tion to fact. As Professor Bodenheimer has noted, "[t]he legal vac-
uum created by the Halvey doctrine, combined with the social
transformations of recent times, have created a situation in which
self-help and the 'rule of seize and run' flourish ...."I'
In Kovacs v. Brewer,6 4 the Court was confronted with an outright
refusal to extend credit to a custody decree of a sister state, yet it
avoided the full faith and credit issue by remanding the case for
clarification as to whether the new decree was based on changed
circumstances. In keeping with the Halvey rule, Justice Frankfurter
noted in dissent that "[a] court that is called upon to determine
to whom and under what circumstances custody of an infant will be
granted cannot, if it is to perform its function responsibly, be bound
by a prior decree of another court . . . ."" In May v. Anderson" the
Court once again evaded the issue, holding only that the full faith
and credit clause does not require credit to be given to a judgment
rendered in personam without jurisdiction over the party sought to
59. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
60. Id. at 614. Mrs. Halvey had taken the child to Florida and obtained a divorce. Mr.
Halvey made no appearance in the action.
61. Id. at 615.
62. Id. at 619.
63. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for
Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. Rav. 1207, 1215 (1969).
64. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
65. Id. at 612.
66. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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be bound. In Ford v. Ford,67 the Court's most recent child custody
pronouncement, it was held, in keeping with the Halvey rule, that
since the court originally taking jurisdiction was not bound by its
own decision, the full faith and credit clause did not prevent the
court of a sister state from modifying the initial decree.
Professor Hudak, in reviewing these decisions, has stated:
"[Tihe consequences of these four vapid decisions by the United
States Supreme Court have been disastrous to countless children of
broken homes. Increasing chaos and confusion have continued to be
the products of custody litigation in American courts." 8 The confu-
sion to which Hudak referred stems largely from the fact that each
of the fpur decisions appears to support a different theory of modifi-
cation jurisdiction, thus allowing courts to refuse to recognize for-
eign custody decrees with relative ease. Three theories of modifica-
tion jurisdiction stand out: (1) the jurisdictional defect theory, (2)
the changed circumstance or condition theory, and (3) the concur-
rent jurisdiction theory.
A. Jurisdictional Defect
The jurisdictional defect theory is supported by the decision in
May v. Anderson." Under this approach, a jurisdictional defect,
such as the failure to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a spouse
at the original hearing, or the fact that the child was neither domi-
ciled nor present in the state, will render the original decree a nullity
in the eyes of the court where modification of the decree is sought.70
As early as 1944, Professor Stansbury found that many of the cases
in which a foreign decree went unrecognized had been justified by
resort to this position.7
B. Changed Circumstances
The holding in Halvey supports the changed circumstances
theory of modification jurisdiction. The theory is given further cred-
ence by Justice Frankfurter's statement in dissent in Kovacs v.
Brewer that
[b]ecause the child's welfare is the controlling guide in a custody
determination, a custody decree is of an essentially transitory na-
67. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
68. Hudak, supra note 2, at 270.
69. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
70. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
71. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 819, 823-24 (1944).
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ture. The passage of even a relatively short period of time may
work great changes, although difficult of ascertainment, in the
needs of a developing child. Subtle, almost imperceptible, changes
in the fitness and adaptability of custodians to provide for such
needs may develop with corresponding rapidity."
At the root of this theory is the "best interest of the child" con-
cept-the idea that at any given moment a custodian may become
"unfit." If this custodial unfitness occurs, a court, acting in the
child's "best interest," will vacate the original decree so as to allow
a more "fit" custodian to assume control. Whether such determina-
tions are truly in the best interest of the child is open to question.
The role of stability in the emotional growth of children has yet to
be fully explored, but, as has been judicially noted, " 'poor parental
models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones.' ,,73
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The theory of concurrent jurisdiction has been attributed to the
opinion by Justice Traynor of California in Sampsell v. Superior
Court."7 Focusing on the "best interest of the child," Justice Traynor
and the court held that "[t]here is authority for the proposition
that courts of two or more states may have concurrent jurisdiction
over the custody of a child. ' 7 5
Legal rationales aside, perhaps the most accurate summation of
the purposes and effects of the modification jurisdiction theories is
that though most courts would presently affirm the principle recog-
nizing foreign custody decrees, such prior decrees are actually rarely
recognized. A court may seize upon any number of legal grounds if
it determines that its disposition is preferable to that of another
court.
VII. RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICAION UNDER THE
UCCJA
The recognition and enforcement sections of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, together with the modification rule, have
been termed "perhaps the most crucial and most directly beneficial
provision[s] of the Act." The benefit stems from the fact that
72. 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958).
73. McCutchan v. McCutchan, 483 P.2d 93, 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) (quoting Smith v.
Green, 480 P.2d 437, 439 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1971)).
74. 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948).
75. Id. at 749.
76. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 FAm. L.Q. 304, 311-12
(1969).
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under these rules it will be difficult, if not impossible, for courts to
modify a prior custody decree arbitrarily. Nor will it be profitable
to either remove a child from this state or bring a child into this
state unlawfully to obtain custody in opposition to a prior order.
Section 61.1328, Florida Statutes, provides that a custody decree
of another state must be recognized and enforced if it was rendered
under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with, or
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
the UCCJA.77 In accord is section 61.1332(1), which provides that a
foreign custody decree, when filed in the office of any circuit court
of the state, becomes automatically enforceable and, in effect, con-
verted .into a local decree, enforceable by contempt proceedings or
any other permissible method."
Section 61.133(1) details the conditions under which a decree may
be modified. If the original decree was made under jurisdictional
standards in accordance with the Act, and the original court main-
tains jurisdiction, the decree may not be modified despite the possi-
ble existence of concurrent jurisdiction.7"
VIII. CONCLUSION
Professor Hudak has noted that
the law of child custody and visitation in our country has gone from
one extreme of a court's declining to re-examine the foreign decree
to the other extreme of a court's refusing to recognize it and open-
ing the floodgate to unchecked litigation and relitigation-at the
expense of countless innocent children who become pawns of insen-
sate, vindictive parents and a generally self-serving court system. 0
The passage of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in the
State of Florida may, at last, close the floodgate.
77. FLA. STAT. § 61.1328 (1977).
78. Id. § 61.1332(1).
79. Id. § 61.133(1).
80. Hudak, supra note 2, at 272.
